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THE STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN NEWS

*The Presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian Newspapers**

By

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1. *Introduction*

In this article the general problem of factors influencing the flow of news from abroad will be discussed, following the kind of reasoning given by Østgaard in his article,¹ but in a somewhat different way. A systematic presentation of factors that seem to be particularly important will be followed by a simple theory and the deduction of some hypotheses from them. No claim is made for completeness in the list of factors or 'deductions'. Some of these hypotheses will then be tested on data relating to the presentation in four Norwegian newspapers of three particular and recent crises abroad. Gaps in our present knowledge will be indicated and some possible policy implications drawn.


The point of departure is our world as a geographic structure divided roughly into 160 territories, most of which are called nations and are 'autonomous'. The international community of nations is structured by a number of variables and highly stratified into 'topdog' and 'underdog' nations so that the world is geography on which are superimposed two relatively similar levels of human organization: the inter-individual and the international. The two levels are not independent of each other and the more they are linked (the more population and leadership in any nation are interdependent), and the more nations are interdependent because of increasing efficiency of communication and military action,²

the more valid is the old sociological slogan about 'everything's relevance for everything else'.

Thus, the world consists of individual and national actors, and since it is axiomatic that action is based on the actor's image of reality, international action will be based on the image of international reality. This image is not shaped by the news media (press, radio, TV, newsreels) alone; personal impressions and contacts, professional relations abroad, diplomatic dispatches, etc., count too — whether less, equally much or more, we do not know. But the regularity, ubiquity and perseverance of news media will in any case make them first-rate competitors for the number-one position as international image-former. Since the adequacy of an action is often, but by no means always, positively related to the adequacy of the image on which it is based,³ research into the adequacy of the image the news media give of the world is of primary importance.

At the interpersonal level the relationship between the *events*, the *perception* with all the selective and distorting factors that are operative under different circumstances, and the final *image* is relatively well explored. At the level of collective perception, where perception is made on behalf of others to be relayed to these others later, the situation is much more complicated. From world events to personal image we have the chain of communication presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1. *The chain of news communication*



We are concerned with the first half of this chain, from world events to news image, or, to be more specific, to the printed page in the newspaper since our data refer to that. In other words: *how do 'events' become 'news'?* This does not mean that the second half is unimportant — on the contrary, it is the personal image, not the newspaper that counts, but this will be discussed in a later article. In analyzing the first half we shall treat the news media as non-personal indivisible entities and not distinguish between the journalist in the field in the news-sending country, the local press agency bureau, the district bureau, the central bureau of the press agency, the district bureau on the receiving end, the local bureau in the news-receiving country, the news editor in the receiving newspaper, the layout man, and what not — to indicate a chain with some seven or eight steps in it.⁴ The chain may of course be much shorter if the newspaper has a correspondent; it may then be reduced to event-correspondent-editor, which involves two steps only. Østgaard has indicated many of the problems along this chain⁵ and detailed analysis here is certainly important for future research, but our analysis will treat news media *in abstracto* and limit itself to some reasoning from first principles.

2. The theory

To do this a metaphor with sufficient heuristic power to offer insights (but certainly not proofs) is useful. One such metaphor is as follows. Imagine that the world can be likened to an enormous set of broadcasting stations, each one emitting its signal or its program at its proper wavelength. (Another metaphor might be of a set of atoms of different kinds emitting waves corresponding to their condition.)

The emission is continuous, corresponding to the truism that something is always happening to any person in the world. Even if he sleeps quietly, sleep is 'happening'⁶ — what we choose to consider an 'event' is culturally determined. The set of world events, then, is like the cacophony of sound one gets by scanning the dial of one's radio receiver, and particularly confusing if this is done quickly on the medium-wave or short-wave dials. Obviously this cacophony does not make sense, it may become meaningful only if one station is tuned in and listened to for some time before one switches on to the next one.

Since we cannot register everything, we have to select, and the question is what will strike our attention. This is a problem in the psychology of perception and the following is a short list of some obvious implications of this metaphor:

- F₁: *If the frequency of the signal is outside the dial it will not be recorded.*
- F₂: *The stronger the signal, the greater the amplitude, the more probable that it will be recorded as worth listening to.*
- F₃: *The more clear and unambiguous the signal (the less noise there is), the more probable that it will be recorded as worth listening to.*
- F₄: *The more meaningful the signal, the more probable that it will be recorded as worth listening to.*
- F₅: *The more consonant the signal is with the mental image of what one expects to find, the more probable that it will be recorded as worth listening to.*
- F₆: *The more unexpected the signal, the more probable that it will be recorded as worth listening to.*
- F₇: *If one signal has been tuned in to the more likely it will continue to be tuned in to as worth listening to.*
- F₈: *The more a signal has been tuned in to, the more probable that a very different kind of signal will be recorded as worth listening to next time.*

Some comments on these factors are in order. They are nothing but common-sense perception psychology translated into radio-scanning and event-scanning activities. The proper thing to do in order to test their validity would be to observe journalists at work or radio listeners operating with the dial — and we have no such data. For want of this the factors should be anchored in general reasoning and social science findings (but references to the latter will be given in the notes only since they are not essential to our reasoning).

The first factor is trivial when applied to radio sets, less so when applied to events in general. Since this is a metaphor and not a model we shall be liberal in our interpretation of 'frequency' and proceed as follows. By the 'frequency' of an event we refer to the time-span needed for the event to unfold itself and acquire meaning. For a soldier to die during a battle this time-span is very short; for a development process in a country to take place the time-span may be very long. Just as the radio dial has its limitation with regard to electro-magnetic waves, so will the newspaper have its limitations, and the thesis is that *the more similar the frequency of the event is to the frequency of the news medium, the more probable that it will be recorded as news by that news medium*. A murder takes little time and the event takes place between the publication of two successive issues of a daily, which means that a meaningful story can be told from one day to the next. But to single out one murder during a battle where there is one person killed every minute would make little sense — one will typically only record the battle as such (if newspapers were published every minute the perspective could possibly be changed to the individual soldier). Correspondingly, the event that takes place over a longer time-span will go unrecorded unless it reaches some kind of dramatic climax (the building of a dam goes unnoticed but not its inauguration).

Needless to say, this under-reporting of trends is to some extent corrected by publications with a lower frequency. A newspaper may have a habit of producing weekly 'reviews', there are weeklies and monthlies and quarterlies and yearbooks — and there are *ad hoc* publications. If we concentrate on dailies, however, the thesis is probably valid and probably of some heuristic value when other aspects of news communication are to be unraveled.

The second thesis is simply that there is something corresponding to the idea of 'amplitude' for radio waves. What this says is only that the bigger the dam, the more will its inauguration be reported *ceteris paribus*; the more violent the murder the bigger the headlines it will make. It says nothing about what has greater amplitude, the dam or the murder. It can also be put in a more dichotomous form: there is a threshold the event will have to pass before it will be recorded at all.⁷ This is a truism, but an important one.

The third hypothesis is also trivial at the radio level but not at the news level. What is 'signal' and what is 'noise' is not inherent; it is a question of convention,⁸ as seen clearly when two radio stations are sending on the same frequency. Clarity in this connection must refer to some kind of one-dimensionality, that there is only one or a limited number of meanings in what is received. Thus interpreted the hypothesis says simply the following: the less ambiguity the more the event will be noticed. This is not quite the same as preferring the simple to the complex, but one precization of it rather; an event with a clear interpretation, free from ambiguities in its meaning, is preferred to the highly ambiguous event from which many and inconsistent implications can and will be made.⁹

The fourth hypothesis also deals with meaning but not with its ambiguity. 'Meaningful' has some major interpretations. One of them is 'interpretable within the cultural framework of the listener or

reader' and all the thesis says is that actually some measure of *ethnocentrism* will be operative: there has to be *cultural proximity*. That is, the event-scanner will pay particular attention to the familiar, to the culturally similar, and the culturally distant will be passed by more easily and not be noticed. It is somewhat like the North European radio listener in, say, Morocco: he will probably pass by the Arab music and speech he can get on his dial as quaint and meaningless and find relief in European music and French talk.

The other dimension of 'meaningful' is in terms of *relevance*: an event may happen in a culturally distant place but still be loaded with meaning in terms of what it may imply for the reader or listener. Thus the culturally remote country may be brought in via a pattern of conflict with one's own group.¹⁰

The fifth hypothesis links what is selected to the mental pre-image, where the word 'expects' can and should be given both its cognitive interpretation as 'predicts' and its normative interpretation as 'wants'. A person *predicts* that something will happen and this creates a mental matrix for easy reception and registration of the event if it does finally take place. Or he *wants* it to happen and the matrix is even more prepared, so much so that he may distort perceptions he receives and provide himself with images consonant with what he has wanted. In the sense mentioned here 'news' are actually 'olds', because they correspond to what one expects to happen — and if they are too far away from the expectation they will not be registered, according to this hypothesis of consonance.¹¹

The sixth hypothesis brings in a corrective to the fourth and fifth. The idea is simply that it is not enough for an event to be culturally meaningful and consonant with what it expected — this defines only a vast set of possible news candidates. Within this set, according to the hypothesis, the more unexpected have the highest

chances of being included as news. It is the unexpected *within the meaningful and the consonant* that is brought to one's attention, and by 'unexpected' we simply mean essentially two things: *unexpected* or *rare*. Thus, what is regular and institutionalized, continuing and repetitive at regular and short intervals does not attract nearly so much attention, *ceteris paribus*, as the unexpected and *ad hoc* — a circumstance that is probably well known to the planners of summit meetings.¹² Events have to be unexpected or rare, or preferably both, to become good news.

The seventh hypothesis is the idea that once something has hit the headlines and been defined as 'news', then it will *continue* to be defined as news for some time even if the amplitude is drastically reduced.¹³ The channel has been opened and stays partly open to justify its being opened in the first place, partly because of inertia in the system and partly because what was unexpected has now also become familiar. Thus F_7 is, in a sense, deducible from F_3 and F_6 .

The eighth and final hypothesis refers to the *composition* of such units as evening entertainment for the family around the radio set, the front page of a newspaper, the newscast on radio, the newsreel on TV or in the cinema, and so on. The idea is this: imagine the news editor of a broadcasting station has received only news from abroad and only of a certain type. Some minutes before he is on the air he gets some insignificant domestic news and some foreign news of a different kind. The hypothesis is that the threshold value for these news items will be much lower than would otherwise have been the case, because of a desire to present a 'balanced' whole. Correspondingly, if there are already many foreign news items the threshold value for a new item will be increased.

As mentioned, these eight factors are based on fairly simple reasoning about what facilitates and what impedes perception. They are held to be culture-free in

the sense that we do not expect them to vary significantly with variations in human culture — they should not depend much on cultural parameters. More particularly, we would not expect them to vary much along the east-west, north-south or center-periphery axes which we often make use of to structure the world. In particular, these factors should be relatively independent of some other major determinants of the press. A newspaper may vary in the degree to which it caters to mass circulation and a free market economy. If it wants a mass circulation, all steps in the news chain will probably anticipate the reaction of the next step in the chain and accentuate the selection and distortion effects in order to make the material more compatible with their image of what the readers want. Moreover, a newspaper may vary in the degree to which it tries to present many aspects of the situation, or, rather, like the partners in a court case, try to present only the material that is easily compatible with its own political point of view. In the latter case selection and distortion will probably be accentuated and certainly not decrease.

But there is little doubt that there are also culture-bound factors influencing the transition from events to news, and we shall mention four such factors that we deem to be important at least in the north-western corner of the world. They are:

- F₉: *The more the event concerns elite nations, the more probable that it will become a news item.*
- F₁₀: *The more the event concerns elite people, the more probable that it will become a news item.*
- F₁₁: *The more the event can be seen in personal terms, as due to the action of specific individuals, the more probable that it will become a news item.*
- F₁₂: *The more negative the event in its consequences, the more probable that it will become a news item.*

Again, some comments are in order.

That news is *elite-centered*, in terms of nations or in terms of people, is hardly

strange. The actions of the elite are, at least usually and in short-term perspective, more consequential than the activities of others: this applies to elite nations as well as to elite people. Moreover, as amply demonstrated by the popular magazines found in most countries, the elite can be used in a sense to tell about everybody. A story about how the king celebrates his birthday will contain many elements that could just as well have been told about anybody, but who in particular among ordinary men and women should be picked for the telling of the story? Elite people are available to serve as objects of general identification, not only because of their intrinsic importance. Thus in an elite-centered news communication system ordinary people are not even given the chance of representing themselves. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same should apply to nations.

More problematic is the idea of *personification*. The thesis is that news has a tendency to present events as sentences where there is a subject, a named person or collectivity consisting of a few persons, and the event is then seen as a consequence of the actions of this person or these persons. The alternative would be to present events as the outcome of 'social forces', as structural more than idiosyncratic outcomes of the society which produced them. In a structural presentation the names of the actors would disappear much as they do in sociological analysis and much for the same reason — the thesis is that the presentation actually found is more similar to what one finds in traditional personified historical analysis. To the extent that this is the case the problem is *why*, and we have five different explanations to offer:

1. Personification is an outcome of *cultural idealism* according to which man is the master of his own destiny and events can be seen as the outcome of an act of free will. In a culture with a more materialistic outlook this should not be the case. Structural factors should be emphasized, there will be more events

happening to people or with people as instruments than events caused by people.

2. Personification is a consequence of the need for meaning and consequently for *identification*: persons can serve more easily as objects of positive and negative identification through a combination of projection and empathy.
3. Personification is an outcome of the *frequency-factor*: persons can act during a time-span that fits the frequency of the news media, 'structures' are more difficult to pin down in time and space.
4. Personification can be seen as a direct consequence of the *elite-concentration* but as distinct from it.
5. Personification is more in agreement with modern techniques of news gathering and news presentation. Thus, it is easier to take a photo of a person than of a 'structure' (the latter is better for movies — perhaps), and whereas one interview yields a necessary and sufficient basis for one person-centered news story, a structure-centered news story will require many interviews, observation techniques, data gathering, etc. Obviously there is an egg-chicken argument implied here since it may also be argued that personification came first and that techniques, the whole structure of news communication, were developed accordingly.

We only offer those explanations without choosing between them; first of all because there is no reason to choose as long as they do not contradict each other, and secondly because we have neither data nor theory that can provide us with a rational basis for a choice. It is our hunch that future research will emphasize that these factors reinforce each other in producing personification.

When we claim that *negative* news will be preferred to positive news we are saying nothing more sophisticated than what most people seem to refer to when they say that 'there is so little to be happy about in the news', etc. But we can offer a number of reasons why this state of af-

fairs appears likely, just as we did for the factor of personification. We shall do so using the other factors relatively systematically:

1. Negative news enters the news channel more easily because it satisfies the *frequency* criterion better. There is a *basic asymmetry* in life between the positive, which is difficult and takes time, and the negative, which is much easier and takes less time — compare the amount of time needed to bring up and socialize an adult person and the amount of time needed to kill him in an accident: the amount of time needed to build a house and to destroy it in a fire, to make an airplane and to crash it, and so on. The positive cannot be too easy, for then it would have low scarcity value. Thus, a negative event can more easily unfold itself completely between two issues of a newspaper and two newscast transmissions — for a positive event this is more difficult and specific. Inaugurating or culminating events are needed. A P.R.-minded operator will, of course, see to that — but he is not always present.
2. Negative news will more easily be *consensual and unambiguous* in the sense that there will be agreement about the interpretation of the event as negative. A 'positive' event may be positive to some people and not to others and hence not satisfy the criterion of unambiguity. Its meaning will be blurred by other overtones and undertones.
3. Negative news is said to be more *consonant* with at least some dominant pre-images of our time. The idea must be that negative news fulfills some latent or manifest needs and that many people have such needs. Of the many theories in this field we prefer the cognitive dissonance version because it is falsifiable. The theory, however, presupposes a relatively high level of general anxiety to provide a sufficient matrix in which negative news can be embedded with much consonance. This should be

the case during crises,¹⁴ so a test of this theory would be that during crises news that is not related to the crisis tends to be more negative and not more positive (as a theory of compensation rather than of dissonance/reduction would predict).

- 4. Negative news is more *unexpected* than positive news, both in the sense that the events referred to are more rare, and in the sense that they are less predictable. This presupposes a culture where changes to the positive, in other words ‘progress’, are somehow regarded as the normal and trivial thing that can pass under-reported because it represents nothing new. The negative curls and eddies rather than the steady positive flow will be reported. The test of this theory would be a culture with *regress* as the normal, and in that case one would predict over-reporting of positive news. This is exemplified by news about the illness of an important person: the slightest improvement is over-reported relative to a steady decline.

Again we do not have sufficient theory to make a choice between these possible explanations — nor do we have to do so since they do not exclude each other.

As to these last four factors it was mentioned that they seem to be of particular importance in the northwestern corner of the world. This does not mean that they are not operating in other areas, but one could also imagine other patterns of relationship between the set of events and the set of news. Table 1 shows some examples:

Pattern I is the pattern we have described above. Pattern II would, where the last two aspects are concerned, be more in agreement with socialist thinking, and where the first two are concerned, with big-power thinking. It might fit the news structure of the Soviet Union, but with the important proviso that one would probably use pattern III to describe Western powers. Similarly, a newly independent developing nation might use pattern IV for itself, but also reserve pattern III for former colonial powers. But all this is very speculative.¹⁵

Let us then list systematically the twelve factors we have concentrated on in this analysis; with subfactors:

Events become news to the extent that they satisfy the conditions of

- F₁: *frequency*
- F₂: *threshold*
- F_{2.1}: *absolute intensity*
- F_{2.2}: *intensity increase*
- F₃: *unambiguity*
- F₄: *meaningfulness*
- F_{4.1}: *cultural proximity*
- F_{4.2}: *relevance*
- F₅: *consonance*
- F_{5.1}: *predictability*
- F_{5.2}: *demand*
- F₆: *unexpectedness*
- F_{6.1}: *unpredictability*
- F_{6.2}: *scarcity*
- F₇: *continuity*
- F₈: *composition*
- F₉: *reference to elite nations*

Table 1. *Some patterns of news structure*

Pattern	F ₉ nation	F ₁₀ people	F ₁₁ personification	F ₁₂ negativization
I	elite centered	elite centered	person centered	negative centered
II	elite centered	elite centered	structure centered	positive centered
III	elite centered	elite centered	both	negative centered
IV	non-elite centered	elite centered	person centered	positive centered

- F_{10} : reference to elite people
 F_{11} : reference to persons
 F_{12} : reference to something negative

As mentioned, these twelve factors are not independent of each other: there are interesting inter-relations between them. However, we shall not attempt to 'axiomatize' on this meager basis.

Let us now imagine that all these factors are operating. This means, we hypothesize, three things:

1. *The more events satisfy the criteria mentioned, the more likely that they will be registered as news* (selection).
2. *Once a news item has been selected what makes it newsworthy according to the factors will be accentuated* (distortion).
3. *Both the process of selection and the process of distortion will take place at all steps in the chain from event to reader* (replication).

Thus the longer the chain, the more selection and distortion will take place according to this — but the more material will there also be to select from and to distort if one thinks of the press agencies relative to special correspondents. In other words, we hypothesize that every link in the chain reacts to what it receives fairly much according to the same principles. The journalist scans the phenomena (in practice to a large extent by scanning other newspapers) and selects and distorts, and so does the reader when he gets the finished product, the news pages, and so do all the middle-men. And so do, we assume, people in general when they report something, and, for instance, diplomats when they gather material for a dispatch to their ministry — partly because they are conditioned by their psychology and their culture, partly because this is reinforced by the newspapers.

In general this means that the cumulative effects of the factors should be considerable and produce an image of the world different from 'what really happened' — for instance in the ways indi-

cated by Östgaard.¹⁶ However, since we have no base-line in direct reports on 'what really happened' on which this can be tested we shall proceed in a different direction. Our problem is how the factors relate to each other in producing a final outcome.

Imagine that all factors, for the sake of simplicity, are dichotomized so that an event either possesses them or does not possess them. A given event can receive a score from 0–12 according to this system, and we claim that this is as good a score of that elusive concept of 'newsworthiness' as any, in a culture where F^8 – F^{12} are valid. This has two theoretical implications that will be spelt out. The first one is almost too simple to mention:

Additivity hypothesis: The higher the total score of an event, the higher the probability that it will become news, and even make headlines.

This may be seen as a hypothesis about how journalists work, about how the night editor reacts to incoming news-script or about how the reader reacts when he scans his newspaper for something worth reading. It may be more valid in the first two than in the last case — we do not know. But it is interesting to put down some pairs that should be considered particularly newsworthy:

- (9, 10): *news about elite people in elite nations*¹⁷
- (9, 12): *news of a negative nature relating to elite nations — in other words, big power conflict*
- (10, 12): *news of a negative nature relating to elite people — in other words, struggle for power etc., at the top of society*
- (11, 12): *news of a negative nature relating to persons — in other words, scandals.*

It is hardly necessary to make a content analysis to substantiate the claim that these four categories account for a sizeable fraction of the news presented by newspapers in most parts of the world.

But there is another hypothesis that is less trivial. An event obviously does not have to score 12 to hit the headlines. Imagine the floor level for acceptance is at score 6, which can be obtained in $\binom{12}{6} = 924$ different ways. (This high number, by the way, explains why factors may be operating and still not be noticed by the public: the variety is too great). The im-

a high F_i has already contributed towards the total score. According to the additivity hypothesis there will also be news where both are high, and much prominence will be given to them. But events where both are low will not be admitted as news. Thus, for the simple case of two factors only, F_i and F_j , we have the three kinds of events indicated in Table 2:

Table 2. *A trichotomy of events according to newsworthiness*

	F_i	F_j	Score of news-worthiness
Type 1. <i>Prominent news</i>	high	high	2
Type 2. <i>Ordinary</i>	high	low	1
	low	high	
Type 3. <i>Events, not news</i>	low	low	0

plication of this is only that if the event is low on one dimension or factor *it may compensate for that by being high on another*, and still make the news. For instance, the less an event refers to persons as actors the more negative will it have to be (earthquakes, accidents that are presented in terms of technical errors, not in terms of ‘the human factor’). The more culturally close and hence meaningful the event, the less does it have to refer to elite people — and vice versa: the more culturally distant the event, the more should it refer to elite people, *ceteris paribus* (which corresponds to the impression that rank-and-file people are highly under-reported when they live in far away countries). And so on, and so forth: this will be spelt out in section 5 below:

Since we have 12 factors this principle gives rise to $\binom{12}{2} = 66$ hypotheses, all of the following form:

Complementarity hypothesis:

$$F_i \rightarrow \neg F_j, \quad i \neq j; \quad i, j = 1, 2, \dots, 12$$

The reasoning is always the same; if an event is low on F_i , then it will have to be high on some F_j to make news at all. For a low F_i the probability that any F_j is high is greater than for a high F_i — since

The additivity hypothesis focuses on type 1 and the complementarity hypothesis on type 2 — one might then add the obvious *exclusion hypothesis* that would focus on type 3.

We then turn to the presentation of our data and to a systematic testing and discussion of a selection of the hypotheses mentioned.

3. *The data*

We have selected four Norwegian newspapers, three international crises, and for each crisis a number of variables to use in the content analysis of what the newspapers wrote about the crises. The rationales behind our selections are as follows.

a. *The newspapers*

Newspapers play an important role in Norway¹⁸ and appear in a relatively decentralized pattern. However, when it comes to foreign news only newspapers in the bigger cities would give sufficient coverage to merit a content analysis, and particularly the newspapers in the capital, Oslo. They are 10 in number, and we have selected 4 according to the following design:

Table 3. *The newspapers in the sample, and their average circulation*

Morning					Afternoon				
Radical	I				II				
	1960	67,494	1964	67,000	1960	98,352	1964	95,000	
Conservative	III				IV				
	1960	21,204	1964	16,800	1960	37,040	1964	38,000	

No. I is the government paper, no. II is the afternoon paper of the widest circulation, no. III a conservative paper and no. IV is a conservative afternoon paper, of tabloid format. Apart from the conservative morning paper, circulation figures have been constant during the period. As usual the morning papers are considered more ‘serious’, and indeed are, at least in terms of lay-out, use of headlines and vocabulary — this holds true for the radical as well as for the conservative press. But these political terms are generic terms and do not imply that the papers in the same category follow the same party line.¹⁹

The reason for this particular choice lies in the experimental design we obtain: by means of the two axes in the Table we get a sufficient dispersion to provide a setting for replication. A finding that holds true for all four papers will receive a higher degree of confirmation when the papers are different than when they are similar.²⁰

b. *The crises*

We have selected three crises, and according to a very simple experimental design. We wanted both synchronic and diachronic comparisons to check for consistency in the way news was presented in the four Norwegian papers. For that reason two crises were selected that occurred simultaneously and otherwise were roughly comparable: the Congo and Cuba crises in the summer of 1960. In 1964 a third crisis occurred that had some of the same characteristics, viz. the Cyprus crisis, and we decided to give it the same kind of analytical treatment. Obviously none of the three crises have very definite points of initi-

ation and termination, so we had to select more or less arbitrary cutting points. For the Congo and Cuba these cuts were made so as to coincide almost with the month of July 1960, which will be remembered as a rather conflict-laden one. For Cyprus the month of March and the first half of April 1964 were included. In three appendices we have given chronological surveys of what happened in the three areas during the periods mentioned, according to *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*. We do not claim that they represent well-defined chapters in the books about these crises — nor is that in any sense essential for our purpose.

It may be objected that these three crises are much too special to give a basis for assessing the structure of foreign news, and we would agree with that assertion. On the other hand, the three crises contain elements of particular interest and relevance in the current world situation. The conflicts are acted out in theaters remote from the elite northwestern corners of the world — but with traditional powers in that corner deeply involved — Belgium, France, the USA, Britain. In all three cases world conflicts, both of the East-West and the North-South variety, are superimposed on local conflicts or vice versa: local conflicts develop from world conflicts. The UN intervened in the Congo and Cyprus conflicts and not in the Cuba conflict. In short, many elements of the contemporary international situation are present. In addition the conflicts are so similar that roughly the same analytical scheme can be used so as to obtain comparability.

c. *The variables*

The ‘*unit of analysis*’ is the press cutting as defined by the newspaper itself when it typographically sets a unit apart from its surroundings, such as a news story, an editorial, an article (reportage, interview) or a letter to the editor — to quote the categories we have used. The *contextual unit* is the newspaper itself, which means that for all units we have two kinds of variables: *contextual variables* referring to the newspaper (its name, party color,

or Turkish) on the one hand and Belgium/France-US-Britain/Greece/Turkey on the other. The terms denote a difference in rank and a dependence relationship that is basic to the crises — and nothing else. As can be seen at a glance the list covers some but certainly not all of the factors we are interested in, according to the theory — nevertheless they can be brought to bear on a number of the hypotheses.

Let us then give in Table 4 a brief survey of the nature of our data:

Table 4. *Survey of the press cuttings coded*

Paper	Congo			Cuba			Cyprus		
	News	Other	(N)	News	Other	(N)	News	Other	(N)
I	89%	11%	(112)	98%	2%	(37)	96%	4%	(171)
II	96%	4%	(100)	89%	11%	(43)	88%	12%	(178)
III	90%	10%	(103)	88%	12%	(65)	91%	9%	(241)
IV	87%	13%	(108)	93%	7%	(29)	92%	9%	(75)
Total	91%	9%	(423)	91%	9%	(174)	91%	9%	(665)

date, etc.), and *proper variables* that refer to the unit itself. These variables may again be subdivided into variables that apply to the cutting as a whole (its presentation in the newspaper, its length, its ‘type’ as above, the source in terms of press agency, person quoted, etc.) and variables that apply to what is written. As to the latter we have worked with a list of items and coded a unit according to the presence or absence of these items.

More specifically we have been interested in:

Although it makes little sense to pool the data from the four newspapers — the sample is made for replication and not for estimation — unless they can be shown to be sufficiently homogeneous, it is interesting to see that 91% of the cuttings are news messages in all three cases. Thirty-six units were editorials (divided 23–4–9 on the three crises) and there were 58 articles, etc. (divided 25–8–25). But out of a total of 1,262 pieces this means 3% and 5% respectively — and the number of letters to the editor was less than 1% of

1. <i>Nation</i>	Underdog (colony)		topdog (motherland)		
2. <i>People</i>	top leader		elite	rank-and-file	no people
3. <i>Perspective</i>	East-West	East-colony	West-colony	motherland-colony	UN-colony intra-colony
4. <i>Mode</i>	negative		positive	neutral	(both or neither)
5. <i>Focus</i>	economic		political	social	cultural

We have used the generic terms ‘underdog-colony’ and ‘topdog-motherland’ for, respectively, Congo-Cuba-Cyprus (Greek

the total. Although we shall certainly not neglect this 9% in the total picture we nevertheless feel justified in focusing the

analysis of what was written in these four papers on the news items.

And this brings us to our main justification in presenting these data at all, the answer to the obvious ‘Who cares about four Norwegian papers in the world? — at most half a million Norwegians’. We are concerned with who has transmitted the news and for each unit we have put down the press agency or agencies quoted as a source:

Table 5. *The distribution of the news messages on the press agencies**

	Congo	Cuba	Cyprus
Associated Press (AP)	12%	20%	9%
United Press International (UPI)	20%	17%	17%
Reuters	31%	22%	52%
Agence France-Presse (AFP)	19%	15%	24%
Norsk Telegrambyrå (NTB) ²¹	28%	20%	54%
Tass	1%	2%	0%
Others (N)	4% (382)	1% (158)	4% (612)
Own correspondent	2%	1%	7%**

* Percentages do not add up to 100% since items from different agencies are often pooled together in one unit, and sometimes there is no reference to agency.

** 43 cuttings out of which 37 or 86% are due to paper II — it had a correspondent in Cyprus and this accounts for 23% of its coverage.

The Table substantiates what we are after: the sources of the news in these Norwegian newspapers — among the most important politically — are international. ‘Own correspondent’ is quite insignificant as a category, which is not strange, taking into consideration the

economy of Norwegian newspapers and the distance to these particular theaters.

This means, briefly, that foreign press agencies account for about 95% of the news items about these three crises, and the news items account for 91% of the total number of units appearing in these papers about these crises. That, in turn, means that four foreign press agencies take care of 95% of 91% or about 87% of the total — which again means that Norwegians, *in casu*, are rather dependent for their images of how the international system functions on the quality and quantity of news delivered through these agencies.²²

Consequently our study is a study of a part of the foreign news system, using how it impinges on four Norwegian newspapers in three crises as twelve case studies.

4. *Testing the hypotheses*

We then proceed to tests of the theory of the structure of foreign news with the data we have. All we can do is to exhaust the possibilities our data give for tests of the theory, and we start with:

H₁: *The more distant the nation, the higher the tendency to report elite action.*

If a nation is ‘distant’, here of course taken in the cultural and not in the geographical sense, identification with rank-and-file people will be correspondingly low. At the same time, to become news events will have to fulfill some other requirements. We shall first test this hypothesis on the Congo and Cuba crises since here what is close and what is distant is so obvious. The data are as in Table 6:

Table 6. *Distance of nation and rank of people reported*

<i>Crisis</i> <i>Nation</i>	Congo			Cuba		
	Congo	Belgium	% diff.	Cuba	USA	% diff.
Top leader	47%	15%	+32	53%	23%	+30
Elite	50%	40%	+10	47%	39%	+8
Common people	30%	35%	—5	24%	6%	+18
(N)		(158)			(382)	

Reading downwards one would expect decreasing percentage differences according to the hypothesis; each percentage difference should be lower than the preceding ones. This holds in five out of the six cases and gives us a degree of confirmation of 0.84 using that as a criterion. Rank-and-file Americans went under-

Turks and Turkish Cypriots are hardly very different relative to, say, Norwegians, although the Greeks are probably somewhat more familiar. But Britain can be set apart relative to the other four. The data, in Table 7, are quite interesting and confirm more or less everything we have said, with one important proviso:

Table 7. *Distance of group and rank of people reported, Cyprus*

	Greek Cypriots	Turkish Cypriots	Greeks	Turks	British
Top leader	30%	7%	11%	13%	5%
Elite	4%	4%	6%	5%	12%
Common people	40%	34%	6%	9%	15%
(N)		(612)			

reported in Cuba — and this is certainly understandable if one compares this with the Congo case. There is a difference between nationalizing industrial enterprises and open conflict: the former is more abstract and does not give rise to the same amount of stories about women and children, for instance.

Let us then turn to the data from Cyprus. They are complicated by two factors. First of all, we do not at all have a clear pattern with two parties to the conflict, as between the Congo and Belgium and between Cuba and the USA in July 1960. At least five parties are involved at three levels of dominance. At the bottom there is the conflict between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Related to either and at an intermediate level is the conflict between Greece and Turkey, partly over Cyprus, partly over anything else that can be added. Above that level again looms Britain and other big powers, but we have concentrated on Britain because of her past as a colonial power in Cyprus and her present as the holder of major air-force bases on the island. Thus, there is no clear bipolar pattern here as in the other two cases, with clear foci of identification.²³

Secondly, the ethnical dimension is harder to apply. Greeks and Greek Cypriots,

The British are the only case where there is a clear increase in the percentage of reporting as we move down the social ladder. This is in agreement with the hypothesis of closest identification with the UK since none of the other four percentage-sets have a correspondingly clear and monotone pattern. But if we look at the rest an interesting suspicion emerges: that there has been more identification with the Turks than with the Greeks. Although the differences are small they are there: the common people/top leader ratio is 1.3 for the Greek Cypriots and 4.9 for the Turkish Cypriots, 0.6 for the Greeks and 0.8 for the Turks. Of course, the over-reporting of Makarios may be explained on such bases as the fact that he was well known from the fight against the British and that he, not the Turkish minority leader Dr. Kutchuk is the President of Cyprus. Nevertheless, there is the suspicion of differential identification built into the structure of the news. This is not a part of the hypothesis, however, since cultural distance can hardly be said to be a factor here. But it is nevertheless consistent with what was reported by one Norwegian with special insight into the area, as to British and Turkish views and perspectives being favored in general in the Norwegian press.²⁴

A particular way of looking at this hypothesis is by counting the number of times people are *quoted* in the news. To many readers it will be obvious that common people are quoted in only 2 of the 612 cuttings from the Cyprus crisis, to take one example (more frequently in the Congo news where relative identification with the Belgians was stronger). The elite and the top leaders are very frequently quoted and in general the ratio between cuttings where people are mentioned with quotes and mentioned without quotes decreases rapidly with decreasing rank. This, then, is one more factor of identification that favors the elite.

These general findings were checked for newspaper and stood up against the test — the finding is replicated.

After the relationship between distance of nation and rank of the person reported we turn to the relationship between what we have called 'mode' of reporting and rank of persons reported. We have coded for each cutting whether it reports something 'negative' (something is destroyed, disrupted, torn down) or something 'positive' (something is built up, constructed,

be deduced from the complementarity principle is

H_2 : *The lower the rank of the person, the more negative the event.*

We tested this hypothesis not only within each crisis but also for each country or nationality, which gives a total of nine cases (Cuba, the US, the Congo, Belgium, Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot, Greece, Turkey, Britain). For each case we had three ranks (top leader, elite, rank-and-file) and for each rank the event could be either negative or positive since we discarded all cuttings that were not clear. To arrive at a composite measure -1 was given to a negative cutting and $+1$ to a positive one, and the average 'mode' was computed. Thus, with 80 negative cuttings and 35 positive we would get:

$$\frac{-80 + 35}{80 + 35} = \frac{-45}{115} = -0.39.$$

In general the index ranges from -1 to $+1$, but the limits were hardly attained; the news was almost never completely one-colored.

The data are as in Table 8:

Table 8. *Rank of the person and mode of the event*

	Top leader	Elite people	Common people
1. Cuba	- 0.66	- 0.51	- 0.59
2. USA	- 0.91	- 0.72	- 1.0
3. Congo	- 0.39	- 0.45	- 0.47
4. Belgium.....	- 0.08	- 0.33	- 0.45
5. Greek Cypriots.....	+ 0.16	- 0.20	- 0.38
6. Turkish Cypriots	+ 0.13	- 0.43	- 0.47
7. Greece	+ 0.21	- 0.10	- 0.20
8. Turkey	- 0.26	- 0.18	- 0.38
9. Britain	+ 0.39	- 0.20	- 0.33

put together) and we are interested in knowing, for each of our three rank levels where people are concerned, whether they are seen in a context that is negative or positive (we omit the cuttings where the event-context is coded as 'neutral', 'both' or 'neither'). The obvious hypothesis to

Out of the nine cases the hypothesis is clearly confirmed in cases nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9; which means in 6 of the 9 cases. In the other three the trend from 'elite' to 'common people' is as it should be, but the three top leaders are seen in a more negative context than one would predict

from the theory. Two of these cases, nos. 1 and 2, concern Cuba-US relations which were then in a very critical phase with both top leaders declaring negative actions against one another in an escalating sequence. The third case has to do with the Turkish top leader who in that period used a language characterized by threats and invasion menaces. (See Appendix III.) However, any exception from the rule can always be ‘explained’ away by invoking some special circumstances, so we shall be satisfied by noticing that out of a total of 27 numerical relationships (three for each case) 23 or 85% are in the expected direction, i.e. increasingly negative with decreasing rank. This is

them as causes — is higher, due to the elite concentration reported above. But the proportion of negative events relative to the total number of contexts is higher the lower down in society the news comes from. Or, in other words, where positive events are reported they will be more likely to occur as contexts for an elite person than as something surrounding the common man.

However, one thing is context, another thing is who is seen as the cause of the event. According to our hypothesis one would expect the same pattern if the news stories are analyzed for their tendency to attribute causes to somebody, and this is what we actually get, as Table 9 shows:

Table 9. Rank of causal agent of an event and the mode of the event*

	Yule correlation, Q	Percentage difference	% negative in the news from the group
1. Cuba	1.0	21%	79%
2. USA	1.0	4%	96%
3. Congo	0.47	15%	91%
4. Belgium.....	0.46	18%	76%
5. Greek Cypriots.....	0.80	44%	65%
6. Turkish Cypriots	1.0	25%	94%
7. Cypriots, not specified	0.93	51%	87%
8. Greece	0.76	40%	86%
9. Turkey	0.57	18%	90%
10. Britain	0.57	27%	67%

* Top leader and elite have been pooled together.

high even though the 27 relationships are not independent.

The general finding was checked for newspaper and for press agency and stood up well against that additional source of variation.

Thus, we have been brought a step forward towards the idea that common people have to appear or be presented in a negative context to make news, much more than is the case for people higher up — relatively speaking. It may well be that the total volume of negative events reported in connection with elite people — whether happening to them or having

Thus, the hypothesis is confirmed in 10 out of 10 cases: the lower the rank of the causal agent, the lower also the chance that he is seen in a context of something positive happening.

From here we may turn to the next hypothesis, thus completing the triangle we have made of variables:

H₃: *The more distant the nation, the more negative the event.*

The data in Table 9 are relevant for the hypothesis and do not appear to give any clear pattern of confirmation. We have used the data about causal agents only,

not the data where a nation may also appear as the victim of a negative act. As can be seen the British, as a total, with the three rank categories pooled together, appear as the causes of negative events less frequently than do the others, with the exception of the Greek Cypriots. Correspondingly, the Belgians are causes of negative events less than the Congolese. But the US are producers of negative acts more than the Cubans. One reason may be that these negative acts were actually not seen as negative by the agencies reporting them, often AP and UPI — but as adequate reactions in a situation of intense conflict.

It should be kept in mind that although

Another way of looking at these data now is to ask the question: Cuba, the Congo and Cyprus are far away places, they are ‘culturally distant’ (factor F_{4.1}). How do the events come to be represented at all as news? Because they are made ‘relevant’ (factor F_{4.2}). Thus we get the hypothesis

H₄: *The more culturally distant the theater, the more relevant must the event appear to be.*

Unfortunately, we do not have data from theaters with a wide range in cultural distance, but we can get some idea about the validity of this hypothesis in Table 10 from the distribution of the news stories on what might be called the ‘perspective’:

Table 10. *Location of the theater and perspective of the news story*

<i>Crisis</i>	<i>Relations between</i>						<i>(N)</i>
	<i>East-West</i>	<i>East- 'colony'</i>	<i>West- 'colony'</i>	<i>Motherland- 'colony'</i>	<i>UN- 'colony'</i>	<i>Intra- 'colony'</i>	
Cuba	9%	35%	22%	59%	9%	20%	(158)
Congo.....	9%	20%	20%	52%	41%	36%	(382)
Cyprus	0%	4%	8%	54%	59%	29%	(612)

the material includes all news from the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus in the periods of analysis, this is not the case with the ‘mother countries’: Belgium, the USA, the UK, Greece, and Turkey. News from those places which have no relevance to the areas of crisis have appeared in the papers in addition to the coded items. (Just to mention one example: the death and funeral of King Paul of Greece took place in the middle of March, causing Greece to appear quite heavily in the news stories for a week.) In the case of culturally close countries like the UK, the USA and Belgium, a great variety of news stories reaches the papers every day, regardless of major events. This would serve to balance off the negative impression these countries give as partners in the colonial crises analyzed. Nevertheless we do not feel that H₃ has been confirmed, although it has not been disconfirmed either.

A purely cold-war perspective involving East and West alone has not been made much use of, but East and West reappear in their relations with the ‘colony’, thus increasing relevance by linking the conflict to the East-West system. Most important, of course, is the ‘motherland-colony’ perspective, appearing in more than half of all the news stories. It may be said that this was what the conflicts were about, but that is not so obvious. There are many ways of presenting an event, and particularly many ways of presenting what to many appeared as fights of independence. Thus, nationalization of industries, independence of a new nation and the fight between a majority and a minority might all have been presented as fairly internal events with local actors only and the ‘motherland’ appearing more as a constant condition that could be mentioned in, perhaps, 10% of the stories.

But this would have presupposed a much higher degree of identification, up to the level one probably had in the newspapers from the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus during those periods. Instead, events are seen as unfolding themselves in the periphery of the ‘motherland’ with no real local auto-

ain in 31% of the stories, which is a high percentage if one conceives of the conflict as essentially limited to the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus triangle.

There is another way of testing the hypothesis, taking as in Table 11 the focus of the news story as point of departure.

Table 11. *Location of the theater and focus of the news story*

<i>Crisis</i>	<i>Focus</i>				(N)
	Economic	Political	Social	Cultural	
Cuba	63%	56%	0%	1%	(158)
Congo.....	13%	86%	11%	2%	(382)
Cyprus	10%	95%	1%	0%	(612)

nomy. The ‘colonies’ are not causally self-sufficient. News stories that have an ‘intra-colony’ perspective exist, but there are two simple explanations for that. The first one is in terms of F_{12} — the idea that events will have to be negative — and simply refers to the fact that in both the Congo and Cyprus local conflict is at the root of the ‘crisis’. Even under this condition, however, the local conflict is not enough: some familiar groupings, such as the East, the West, the motherland, the UN, have to be added to it to make it really newsworthy. And the other explanation is in terms of F_7 : since the theater is already in the news it will probably remain in the news because an apparatus has been established that requires a certain quantity of news stories to be maintained.

That there are explanations of the *mechanism* underlying this in terms of such factors as the nationality of the press agencies and the training of some of the journalists, whether they are foreign or local by nationality, is obvious. Thus, one would expect the news from Cyprus to be much concerned with events seen as relevant to Britain, since the British agency Reuters appears in connection with 52% of the news stories. One consequence of this is found in the circumstance that Cyprus is seen in its relationship to Brit-

The figures are quite clear and tell the kind of story one would predict: the three countries in the world periphery enter by way of variables that link them to the center part of the world. ‘Social’ and ‘cultural’ are more internal and do not have the same immediate ramifications to the topdog nations. The only variation in the focus is from economic to political as one moves from Cuba via the Congo situation to Cyprus, and that corresponds well to most images of ‘what really happened’.

Again, the findings hold up against the variation in newspaper and press agency. We let this suffice as an indication of how hypotheses derived from the complementarity theory can be tested.

It may be objected that what we have said is an artefact of the three crises we have picked for our sample. There is no other way of exploring this objection than by means of a new project.

5. *Discussion*

On the basis of what we have presented we feel that it would be unreasonable not to have some confidence in the general hypothesis. There is probably such a phenomenon as *complementarity of news factors* although much remains to be done in terms of refinement of the hypothesis. Under what conditions will the effect be

more pronounced or less pronounced, which pairs of factors tend to produce the strongest (or the weakest) effect of complementarity, and how do the factors combine in patterns of three and four, etc.? We leave this for future research, and turn to a discussion of what this implies — under the assumption of the general validity of our thesis.

A discussion of this kind can best be done by selecting out of the 66 possible pairs some crucial pairs that are particularly important in terms of their consequences for the kind of image of the world that they will promote. The numbers refer to the list of twelve factors. These hypotheses are bivariate only, and coming research in this field will have to carry the thinking and the analysis up to, at least, the level of three variables or factors at the same time.

- (1,4): *The more distant a nation is, the more will an event have to satisfy the frequency criterion.*

In other words: the distant nation will have to produce events that capture attention particularly easily in order to be recorded. The consequence of this is an abruptness and unconnectedness that the news from such countries will display. Natural disasters and accidents will play an important role, and changes of government. The build-up of events, based on small quantitative changes, will go under-reported — it is only when they lead to the big qualitative changes that they make news. This again may provide readers with an image of these countries as places where things happen all of a sudden and in an unpredictable way — in other words inherently dangerous and inherently different places.

- (4,3): *The more distant an event, the less ambiguous will it have to be.*

The remote and the strange will at least have to be simple if it is to make news — complexities can be taken care of if they are found within one's own cul-

ture, but not if they are found at a considerable distance. The implication of that is obvious! The culturally distant acquires a presentation in terms of 'ideal types'; whole nations and continents are described in sweeping terms and this may leave the impression of a uniformity and homogeneity that is not present in the reality of that nation. One's own nation is described in complex terms which will correspond more to the idea most people have of a 'civilized existence'. On the other hand, the phenomenon indicated here will tend to foster the idea of a simple, primitive and more 'human' kind of existence in remote countries.

- (4,5): *The more distant the nation, the more consonant will the news have to be.*

For a far away nation to make news it will be particularly necessary that the news should fit a pattern of expectation. Thus the *golpe militar* in Latin America, according to this hypothesis, will make news exactly because that is what is expected — it is a case of news being 'olds'. The opposite development will not so easily fit the expectation pattern and for that reason less easily be reported, because probably it will, consciously or unconsciously, be registered as a quasi-event that will not last. Any story of sexual extremism from Sweden will receive an a priori credibility that will make it pass many filters of news communication, whereas stories or statistics to the opposite effect may be seen as atypical or even fake and propaganda, and not be reported. The consequence of this will be that distant nations appear as essentially unchangeable whereas one's own cultural sphere undergoes real, basic change.

- (7,2): *The higher the continuity effect, the lower can the threshold be.*

We only list this hypothesis for the sake of completeness, for it is actually the definition of the

continuity effect. Once an event has 'made it' the news channel will be more readily open for the follow-up events, at a lower threshold value. The effect of this will be the creation of 'news strings' that may create artificial continuities just because the channel is open.

(8,2): *The higher the composition effect, the lower can the threshold be.*

This is also listed for the sake of completeness, since it is already included in the definition of the composition effect. The idea is simply that news can enter because of under-representation of categories that should be represented according to some overall judgement — not because they are important by themselves. This, in turn, means that in periods where little else happens abroad the limit defining newsworthiness may be drastically lowered so as to include news items that score relatively low, and this in turn may produce images of discontinuity that do not correspond to the real world.

(1,12): *The less negative the news, the more important the frequency condition.*

This is already referred to in connection with the theory for the negativism of the news. But here it is put in a stronger form: positive events will have to be particularly short of duration to appear as news. This means, essentially, that a premium will be put on the ability to make ceremonies where developments can be telescoped into an event that is reportable. Obviously the more elite people can be added to it the better for the newsworthiness, and this has a double effect. First of all it may contribute to a false image of how positive developments come about, since the amount of planning and painstaking work, mostly and in most cases by non-elite people, goes under-reported. Secondly it forces many people into a kind of activity usually referred to as P.R.

— public relations — that is often accepted as a part of their work, where one might question the wisdom of the structure of the news communication instead.

(9,4): *The lower the rank of the nation, the lower must the cultural distance be.*

This only means that if a nation is low in terms of rank it must compensate for that in terms of proximity. Or in other words: the topdog nations of the world will each have their own set of underlings that they over-report from, relative to what they report from other low rank nations. For the U.S. it will be Latin America, for France Communauté Française, for Britain the Commonwealth countries, for the Soviet Union the socialist bloc, for China (probably) selected countries in South and Far East Asia. This pattern, in turn, will tend to reinforce existing divisions of the world since reporting will probably make for some kind of identification.

(9,5): *The lower the rank of the nation, the more consonant will the news have to be.*

This is very similar to the hypothesis of the relationship between distance and consonance — but whereas that hypothesis emphasized consonance with what one would expect from more or less stereotyped conceptions of a foreign culture, we are here concerned with stereotypes about low rank. The typical example would be news that emphasizes the difficulties low rank nations have: signs of 'immaturity' in terms of payment crises, political instability, murder at the top of society, etc.. The consequences are the same as for hypothesis (4,5) above.

(10,6): *The lower the rank of the person, the more unexpected will the news have to be.*

This has actually been touched upon in different contexts al-

ready and the idea is simply that whereas elite people can have their day-to-day routine reported, rank-and-file people will only make news when something happens that stands in a very marked contrast to their ordinary existence. The good examples are sudden acquisitions of wealth and negative actions.

(9,10): *The lower the rank of the nation, the higher will a person have to be placed in that nation to make news.* This may lead to an image of the world underdog nations as extremely elite-dominated with a non-existing mass of rank-and-file people. In political terms this image will probably tend to reinforce the conditions that make such images warranted. This will also make for poor identification particularly if elite action in low rank nations is also negative.

(9,12): *The lower the rank of the nation, the more negative will the news from that nation have to be.*

In other words, when something positive and good is happening it will have to be located in a high ranking nation — from the underdog nations of the world, typically, news reports will be overwhelmingly negative. The Latin American proverbial case of the *galpe militar* is one example; all the disaster news from such nations is another. The thesis is that positive things that happen in the underdog countries will go under-reported and this will promote an image of those countries as being unable to govern themselves, and as inherently inferior to the top-dog countries.

(10,12): *The lower the rank of a person, the more negative will his actions have to be.*

In other words, the thesis is that common people must do something negative to make news, and the lower down the person is, the more negative should it be. At the bottom of

society one enters the news pages more easily as a criminal — but sport should of course be mentioned as the big compensating mechanism. It may also be regarded as so important, together with the arts and entertainment, that it actually invalidates the hypothesis. Nevertheless, the kind of positive action the rank-and-file person has it in his power to perform is, perhaps, more likely to be of a kind that will never make the news — not only for the reason mentioned in the hypothesis but because it does not satisfy the criteria of frequency, threshold, unexpectedness and continuity either. If the ordinary man is to enter positively, it will probably have to be in an article, reportage, etc. It may be objected that he enters when he wins in the lottery — but this is not an act of his — it happens to him, like a catastrophe. The implication of all this may easily be a kind of reinforcement of class society in the sense that the top is over-represented with the good and the positive that occurs, and the lower layers of society are portrayed as producers of less fortunate events.

(11,12): *The less personal the news, the more negative will it have to be.*

In other words, when something positive happens it is more likely to be attributed to people, whereas something attributed to non-people will have to be negative to hit the news. In a sense this may also be seen as a reflection of the dominant idea of man as the maker of his own progress against the forces of nature that tend to inundate him with floods, shake him to pieces with earthquakes, etc.

It may be worth while to collect together what has been said about nations that are culturally distant and nations that are low in international rank.²⁵ We can combine it because what we have said

should *a fortiori* be valid when these two criteria — negative for newsworthiness — are superimposed on each other. In short, from such countries news will have to refer to people, preferably top elite, and be preferably negative and unexpected but nevertheless according to a pattern that is consonant with the ‘mental pre-image’. It will have to be simple and it should, if possible, provide the reader with some kind of identification — it should refer to him or his nation or group of nations. This will, in turn, facilitate an image of these countries as dangerous, ruled by capricious elites, as unchanging in their basic characteristics, as existing for the benefit of the topdog nations, and in terms of their links to those nations. Events occur, they are sudden, like flashes of lightning, with no build-up and with no let-down after their occurrence — they just occur and more often than not as a part of the machinations of the ruling or opposition elites.

The consequence of all this is an image of the world that gives little autonomy to the periphery but sees it as mainly existing for the sake of the center — for good or for bad — as a real periphery to the center of the world. This may also tend to amplify more than at times might seem justified the image of the world’s relatedness. Everything’s relevance for everything else, particularly for us, is overplayed. Its relevance to itself disappears:

Mr. Mboya complained of the Press (foreign-owned) in Africa behaving and writing as though it were operating in London, Paris or New York ‘where the problems and anxieties are entirely different from those current in Africa’. He said these and many other questions kept coming up in the minds of many Africans as they try to figure out what freedom of the press meant in the African context. He was of the view, therefore, that it was important that the Press should concern itself with finding out what goes on in the African mind. The world’s verdict on Africa, how-

ever, was often reduced from subjective dispatches of foreign journalists paying short visits to the various parts of Africa. The result was that news coming out of Africa was often related to the already biased and prejudiced mind that keeps asking such questions as: ‘is this pro-East or pro-West?’ but nobody asked: ‘is this pro-African?’²⁶

This is particularly dramatic in connection with new countries. Their newness, which is probably the major fact for the majority of their inhabitants, is not stressed except as reports from the independence ceremony if there is any (because it satisfies F_1). Instead the news is interpreted in a context of the old, and since all three countries were centers of major events in the periods we have analyzed, they have probably for many people come to be defined for some time through these crises. This, in turn, may influence people’s behavior towards the nations in question, and if they are very young nations serve as a kind of imprinting experience,²⁷ with the consequences that implies for later relationships. It would be interesting to know something more precise about how far behind political independence what one might call causal independence (or auto-causation, causal autonomy) is lagging.

As to the developed countries the general implication of what we have said has already been mentioned: conflict will be emphasized, conciliation not.²⁸

6. *Some policy implications*

The policy implications of this article are rather obvious: try and counteract all twelve factors. More specifically, this means:

1. More emphasis on build-up and background material in the total media output. Journalists should be better trained to capture and report on long-term development, and concentrate less on ‘events’.

2. Occasional reports on the trivial even if it does not make 'news', to counter-balance the image of the world as composed of strings of dramatic events.

3. More emphasis on complex and ambiguous events, not necessarily with any effort to interpret them.

4. More reports from culturally distant zones even if the content has no immediate relevance for oneself. Experiments with newspapers in different countries exchanging local columns might prove even more interesting than reprinting what was said in the newspaper fifty or a hundred years ago.

5. More emphasis on the dissonant, on that which does not fit stereotypes. Training of journalists to increase their insights into their own stereotypes so as to facilitate their awareness of the consonance factor.

6. More emphasis given to the predictable and frequent, for the same reason as under 2 above.

7. More awareness of the continuity factor — and at the same time more emphasis on follow-ups even if the chain of events has been interrupted for some time. Often one has the impression that one hears about something negative that has happened but not about how it has been counteracted, if the time-span is so long that the continuity has been broken.

8. More awareness of the composition factor in order not to create news artefacts.

9. More coverage of non-elite nations.

10. More coverage of non-elite people.

11. More reference to non-personal causes of events. Special training is probably needed here.

12. More reference to positive events.

These implications work on one factor at a time and would, if implemented, reduce the effects of the factors. However, the combined effects of the factors might still persist even if the effect of any one factor is reduced.

One might say that all or much of this is what the elite paper tries to do, and that is probably true. However, elite papers are probably mainly read by elite people and this may increase the distance between center and periphery where international perspective is concerned.

Hence one additional need is for a more widely dispersed style of news communication in agreement with these principles. It should be emphasized, however, that the present article hypothesizes rather than demonstrates the presence of these factors, and hypothesizes rather than demonstrates that these factors, if present, have certain effects among the audience.

NOTES

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¹ Einar Østgaard, 'Factors Influencing the Flow of News', *Journal of Peace Research*, 1965, no. 1, pp. 39 ff.

² For an interesting article making systematic use of these two indicators of interdependence, see Kaare Svalastoga, 'Technology and Autonomy', *Acta Sociologica*, Vol. 5, pp. 91–99.

³ Thus, a completely realistic image of other people's image of oneself might have a harmful effect on the social adequacy of one's behavior. Thus, there is the important finding by Caplow and McGee (*The Academic Marketplace*, New York: Basic Books, 1958) that members of organizations are often subject to an Aggrandizement Effect whereby they overestimate their own organ-

ization relative to others in the field. One might argue that if they did not, the consequent drop in self-image would result in lower achievement levels. And this may have a parallel in the field of international affairs: if the news structure was symmetric, giving to each nation its due, relative to how it was estimated by other nations, an important source of self-pride and assertiveness might be too weak to spur effective action.

⁴ For one way of describing this chain see Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboe Ruge, *Presentasjonen av utenriksnyheter* (Oslo: PRIO stencil no. 14-1, 1962), pp. 71-78.

⁵ Østgaard, op. cit., pp. 42 f.

⁶ For an impression of what sociologists can get out of the condition of sleeping see Vilhelm Aubert and Harrison White, 'Sleep: A Sociological Interpretation', *Acta Sociologica*, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 46-54 and Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 1-16.

⁷ This, of course, is a fundamental idea in the psychology of perception. Actually there are two separate ideas inherent here: the notion of an absolute level that must not be too low, and the notion of the increase needed to be noticed — the 'just noticeable differences' (jnd's). The jnd increases with increasing absolute level; the stronger the amplitude, the more difference is needed to be noticed (whether this is according to Weber's principle or not). This principle probably applies very explicitly to news communication: the more dramatic the news, the more is needed to add to the drama. This may lead to important distortions. The more drama there already is, the more will the news media have to exaggerate to capture new interest, which leads to the hypothesis that there is more exaggeration the more dramatic the event — i.e. the less necessary one might feel it is to exaggerate.

⁸ N. R. Ashby in *An Introduction to Cybernetics* (New York: Wiley, 1957) defines noise simply as distortion that may create differences in interpretation at the sender and receiver ends of a communication channel. But one may just as well say that the signal distorts the noise as vice versa.

⁹ B. Berelson and G. A. Steiner in their *Human Behavior! An Inventory of Scientific Findings* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963) mention a number of principles under 'Perceiving', and two of them are (p. 112 and p. 100):

B7: The greater the ambiguity of the stimulus, the more room and need for interpretation.

B3.3a: There may also be decreased awareness of stimuli if it is important *not* to see (perceptual defense).

What we have been doing is to combine these theorems (but not deductively) into the idea of defense against ambiguity. There are several reasons for this. Modern newspapers are mass media of communication, at least most of them, and publishers may feel (justifiably or not) that increase in ambiguity may decrease the sales. Moreover, to the extent that news shall serve as a basis for action orientation ambiguity will increase rather than reduce the uncertainty and provide a poorer basis for action.

¹⁰ The common factor behind both dimensions of what we have called 'meaningfulness' is probably 'identification'.

¹¹ Again, some findings from Berelson and Steiner are useful (op. cit., p. 101 and p. 529):

B3.2: With regard to expectations, other things equal, people are more likely to attend to aspects of the environment they anticipate than to those they do not, and they are more likely to anticipate things they are familiar with.

B3.3: With regard to motives, not only do people look for things they need or want; but the stronger the need, the greater the tendency to ignore irrelevant elements.

A1: People tend to see and hear communications that are favorable to their predispositions; they are more likely to see and hear congenial communications than neutral or hostile ones. And the more interested they are in the subject, the more likely is such selective attention.

¹² For a discussion of this see Johan Galtung, 'Summit Meetings and International Relations', *Journal of Peace Research*, 1964, pp. 36-54.

¹³ For a discussion of this factor see Østgaard, op. cit., pp. 151.

¹⁴ Festinger has a very interesting account of how Indians selected rumors following an earthquake, and consistent with the fear provoked by the earthquake: 'Let us speculate about the content of the cognition of these persons. When the earthquake was over they had this strong, persistent fear reaction but they could see nothing different around them, no destruction, no further threatening things. In short, a situation had been produced where dissonance existed between cognition corresponding to the fear they felt and the knowledge of what they saw around them which, one might say, amounted to the cognition that there was nothing to be afraid of. The vast majority of the rumors which were widely circulated were rumors which, if believed,

provided cognition consonant with being afraid. One might even call them “fear-provoking” rumors, although, if our interpretation is correct, they would more properly be called “fear justifying” rumors.’ Leon Festinger, ‘The Motivating Effect of Cognitive Dissonance’, in Gardner Lindzey (Ed.), *Assessment of Human Motives* (New York: Grove Press, 1958), p. 72.

¹⁵ As an example some impressions can be given from three months systematic reading of the Moroccan newspaper *Le Petit Marocain*. In very summarized form: the first page contained news about progress in Morocco, the second about decadence, murder, rape and violence in France — so that anybody could draw his conclusion. Of course, such things will depend rather heavily on the value-systems of the editorial staff — but we nevertheless postulate the existence of general patterns. Ola Mårtensson, in a mimeographed report (in Swedish) of a content analysis of three major papers in the USSR, indicates both personification and elite concentration. Ola Mårtensson, *Pravda, Izvestija och Krasnaja Zvezda under våren och hösten 1964* (Lund: Institute for Political Science, Lund University, Sweden, 1965), 26 pp. mimeo.

¹⁶ Östgaard, op. cit., pp. 52 ff.

¹⁷ As an example it can be mentioned that in a survey carried out in Norway, November–December 1964, to the question ‘What do you think has been the most important event in the news recently?’ 53% answered in terms of elections in the US and changes of power in the Soviet Union, i.e. in terms of the top elite people in the top elite nations. The next answer category, ‘events in the Congo’, made 9%.

¹⁸ Norway appears as No. 7 in a list of 125 countries, according to the *UN Statistical Yearbook 1962* (New York: United Nations, 1963). The variable used is daily newspaper circulation per 1,000 population.

¹⁹ We omit the names of the papers, not so much out of considerateness, which would be out of order — firstly because we have nothing really inconsiderate to say about them, and secondly because they are public phenomena that might well be subject to public appraisals. The names, however, are of interest to Norwegian readers only and carry many connotations that will not be used in the analysis anyhow.

²⁰ Not included in our sample is the biggest Norwegian newspaper with two daily issues and an average 1964 circulation of 168,000. This paper is the one with the most complete coverage of international events. Its political attitude is moderately conservative. The reason for excluding this paper is not only the considerable extra work of coding that it would imply, etc., but also the fact that we were primarily interested in papers with a very clear political profile that would span the political spectrum better.

²¹ One thing that should be explained is ‘Norsk Telegrambyrå’. Only in some very few cases (nine in all) in connection with Norwegian soldiers recruited for UN service in the Congo does this mean that the Norwegian agency was actually the source of the piece of news. In all other cases NTB actually stands for AFP or Reuters and other Scandinavian agencies, since it acts as an agent for these foreign bureaux in Norway. (UPI and AP have their own offices in Oslo.)

²² With the exception that the two less wealthy conservative papers have chosen one each of the American agencies (III does not subscribe to UPI and IV not to AP), all four papers were subscribers to these agencies in 1960 and 1964. And all four agencies (AP, UPI, Reuters, AFP) have their headquarters in the three major powers of the world’s Northwest — a region where Norway is also located.

²³ It should be noted that the time-span covered in the Cyprus crisis is of a somewhat different nature than for the Congo and Cuba. The building up of the Cyprus crisis actually took a long time and only culminated during the winter months of 1963–64. For comparative reasons we still decided to analyze a short period. We chose the weeks immediately prior to and during those in which the UN was actively brought into the conflict, in order to be able to make a comparison with the Congo situation. But this excluded the period in which Greek-Turkish-Cypriot relations were most strained, probably in January–February.

²⁴ Bjarte Kaldhol, ‘Norske soldater til Kypros’, *Dagbladet*, 12/2 1964, p. 4.

²⁵ Wilbur Schramm refers in his book, *Mass Media and National Development* (Paris: UNESCO, 1964, p. 64), to an investigation where Indians have commented on the way India is presented in the American press. Four aspects of this particular news communication are resented, and it is claimed that they represent the greater part of the news total: India in the East-West power struggle and communism, American economic aid to India, stories about disasters and hunger, and stories about ‘bizarre and outlandish things’ in connection with child marriages, untouchability, etc. The first two are typical examples of increased relevance by tying what happens in remote places to one’s own country, the third is a clear case of F_{12} , but also of a case where distant countries are presented as victims rather than agents of what happens. The last factor is a case

of F5.1 — it is consonant in the sense of being predicted from ‘knowledge’ of Indian culture; it fits stereotypes.

²⁶ *The Indian Express*, 11 July 1962, p. 6.

²⁷ For some comments on the phenomenon of ‘imprinting’ see Berelson, Steiner, op.cit., pp. 41 and 43.

²⁸ Alan Coddington, in an unpublished paper, *A Study of Policies Advocated in Conflict Situations by British Newspapers*, studies ten national dailies over a period of two weeks (12 days) to find out how the kind of solution they recommend for conflicts in their editorials relates to whether the conflict is domestic or international. He finds quite opposite patterns for domestic and international conflicts: both are relatively low where recommendations in terms of ‘external settlement’ (mediation and arbitration) are concerned, but whereas domestic issues rank high on ‘mutual adjustment’ (compromise and reconciliation) and low on ‘policies of force’ (conquest and containment), the foreign issues show exactly the contrary pattern. This may be very rational and due to the more integrated nature of the domestic social system relative to the international system. But it may also be seen as a natural consequence of the structure of foreign news and as compatible with our hypotheses about the implications of that structure.

APPENDIX I

A short chronological survey of events in Cuba, July 1960. (From *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*)

- 29/6 The Cuban Government confiscates Texaco's oil refineries.
- 1/7 The Cuban Government confiscates Esso's and Shell's oil refineries because all the refineries had refused to refine Soviet crude oil.
- 5/7 British protest against the confiscation of the Shell refinery. United States reduces its import of Cuban sugar by 700,000 tons.
- 6/7 American protest against the confiscation of the Texaco and Esso refineries.
- 8/7 The Cuban Government refuses to accept the protests, referring to the obligation of the refineries to refine any crude oil. Dr. Miro Cardona requests political asylum in the USA.
- 10/7 The Government of the USSR announces that it will buy 700,000 tons of Cuban sugar in addition to its usual quota.
- 11/7 The Cuban foreign minister accuses the USA of ‘economic aggression’, in the UN Security Council.
- 18–19/7 Debate in the Security Council concerning US-Cuban relations. Decided to hand the matter over to the OAS before any UN steps are taken.
- 17–21/7 Raoul Castro visits the Soviet Union.
- 23/7 The Cuban Government confiscates four US sugar refineries. Trade agreement between Cuba and China concerning a yearly sale of 500,000 tons of Cuban sugar for five years.

APPENDIX II

A short chronological survey of events in the Congo, July 1960. (From *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*)

- 30/6–1/7 The Congo independent at midnight. Speeches by King Baudouin, Prime Minister Lumumba and President Kasavubu. Lumumba attacks the Belgian colonial administration.
- 2/7 Lumumba demands the immediate withdrawal of all Belgian troops from the Congo.
- 5/7 Mutiny among private Congolese soldiers in Thysville and Leopoldville against their Belgian officers. Lumumba and Kasavubu intervene in order to restore order, but with no great success. The anti-European feelings spread to other provinces.
- 7/7 Europeans in the Leopoldville province flee to Congo-Brazzaville.
- 8/7 The Belgian Government announces that troop reinforcements will be sent to the Congo.
- 10/7 Belgian forces attack Congolese in various places.
- 11/7 The Congolese Government appeals to UN for assistance. Tshombe declares Katanga an independent state.
- 14/7 The Security Council adopts a resolution concerning the immediate sending of UN forces to the Congo, and asks Belgium to withdraw its troops. The Congo breaks off diplomatic relations with Belgium.

- 15/7 The first UN troops arrive in Leopoldville.
- 17/7 The Congolese Government informs the UN that it will ask for Soviet troops if the UN does not succeed in getting the Belgian troops out of the country within 72 hours.
- 17/7 Vice-Secretary-General Ralph Bunche reports that an agreement has been reached with the Belgian authorities to withdraw the Belgian troops from Leopoldville.
- 20/7 Tshombe warns the UN against entering Katanga, states that any support of the central government against Katanga will lead to war between Katanga and the rest of the Congo.
- 21/7 The Security Council adopts a resolution requesting Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo as soon as possible, and which authorizes the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to execute the resolution. The Belgian Government declares that its troops will stay in the Congo until law and order have been restored.
- 23/7 Belgian troops entirely withdrawn from Leopoldville.
- 24/7 Lumumba arrives in New York to confer with Secretary-General Hammarskiöld.
- 26/7 Hammarskiöld goes to Bruxelles and Leopoldville.
- 27/7 Hammarskiöld meets Prime Minister Eyskens and King Baudouin in Bruxelles. The Congolese Government issues its political program, stating the wish for cooperation with Belgium and that the foreign policy of the Congolese Government will be characterized by 'positive neutralism'.
- 28/7 Hammarskiöld arrives in Leopoldville for talks with Kasavubu. The Belgian Government issues a detailed report on atrocities in the Congo. The report estimates the number of raped white women to be 291. Number of killed not given. The number of UN soldiers in the Congo is given as 10,000. The number of refugees from the Congo is officially given in Bruxelles as 35,000.
- 29/7 The Belgian Government announces that the withdrawal of some of the troops in the Congo will start at once. No information on when all the troops will be withdrawn.
- 30/7 Announcement after Hammarskiöld's meeting with the Congolese Government that agreement had been reached concerning the task of the UN in the Congo.

APPENDIX III

A short chronological survey of events in Cyprus, December-April 1964. (From *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*)

- 6/12 President Makarios reportedly sends a memorandum to Vice-President Kutchuk concerning his desire to amend certain provisions of the Constitution, such as the separate majority vote on taxation laws, separate courts of justice, separate municipalities and certain other 'unreasonable rights'.
- 21-26/12 Communal violence in Cyprus, in which 200 Greek and Turkish Cypriots were believed to have been killed.
- 25-28/12 Turkish military movements, in and outside Cyprus.
- 26/12 A joint Greek, Turkish and British force, under British command should restore order. This was accepted by all the governments.
- 27/12 Cypriot representative in the UN protests to the Security Council.
- 28/12 The British Colonial Secretary, Mr. Duncan Sandys, arrives in Nicosia for talks with the local leaders.
- 30/12 Vice-President Kutchuk denounces the protest of the Cypriot UN representative, Mr. Rossides. Since the fighting the Turkish Cypriot ministers had refused to attend meetings of the Cabinet, which in consequence had become representative only of the Greek Cypriot community.
- 1/1 The Cypriot Government accepts a proposal that a UN representative should be stationed in Cyprus.
- 16/1 General Gyani appointed UN representative in Cyprus.
- 15/1 A conference in London to decide the future government of Cyprus, attended by the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot delegations, and chaired by Mr. Duncan Sandys, U.K. The conference ended in deadlock towards the end of the month.
- 31/1 An Anglo-American plan for a NATO emergency force to be placed in Cyprus, including the Greek and Turkish forces already on the island.
- 1/2 The Greek and Turkish Governments accept the proposals.

- 2/2 Vice-President Kutchuk accepts the plan in principle.
- 4/2 President Makarios's Government rejects the plan, while stating that it would accept an international force under the Security Council.
- 7/2 Premier Khrushchev protests against the planned NATO force.
- 11-13/2 Heavy fighting in Limassol.
- 15/2 Requests from the British and Cypriot Governments to the Security Council to consider the situation in Cyprus.

Latter part of February. Greek and Turkish military preparations, threats of intervention.

- 2/3 Common Turkish-American and Greek navy maneuvers started.
- 4/3 UN Security Council unanimously approves the formation of an international force and the appointment of a mediator.
- 4-5/3 Shooting in both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot villages.
- 6/3 General Gyani appointed leader of the UN forces.
- 7/3 Secretary-General U Thant asks member governments for voluntary financial contributions to the force.
- Hard fighting in the village of Ktima.
- Forty-nine Turkish hostages released on Makarios's orders.
- 8/3 Cease-fire in Ktima after negotiations led by Gyani. Two-hundred-and-twenty-eight Greek hostages released.
- 9/3 Cease-fire broken.
- 10/3 Vice-President Kutchuk accuses the Greek-Cypriots of intending to eliminate the Turkish-Cypriot society before the arrival of the UN force.
- 13/3 About 13,000 Turkish troops embarked at Iskenderun.
- 14/3 The first part of the Canadian force arrives in Nicosia; the rest to be flown in during the next two weeks.
- 16/3 A secret meeting of the Turkish Parliament agrees to give the Government permission to start a military intervention in Cyprus if necessary.
- 25/3 Ambassador Tuomijojä appointed UN mediator in Cyprus.
- 27/3 The UN force formally established.
- 31/3 President Makarios informs the Greek and the Turkish Prime Ministers that the formation of a UN force had ended the agreement under which Greek and Turkish military units had served under British command, and requested that these units be withdrawn to their camps.
- 1/4 Prime Minister Inonu replies that the Turkish troops would not be withdrawn. About \$ 5.3 million of contributions promised.
- 2/4 Tuomijojä arrives in Nicosia.
- 4/4 President Makarios informs Prime Minister Inonu that Cyprus has ended the alliance treaty with Turkey.
- 6/4 The Turkish Prime Minister warns Makarios that the Turkish Government regards the treaty as still valid, and will take all necessary steps in case of aggressive actions intended to prevent the Turkish-Cypriot minority exercising its rights.
- 7/4 The British force in Cyprus reduced to 4,500 soldiers.
- 8/4 U Thant asks Sweden, Ireland and Finland to increase their forces by 300 soldiers each. Sweden and Finland agree to do so.
- 11/4 President Makarios arrives in Athens for talks with the Greek Government and with General Grivas.
- 14/4 Makarios returns to Cyprus.

S U M M A R Y

Using a simplified psychology of perception and some additional assumptions, a system of twelve factors describing events is presented that together are used as a definition of 'newsworthiness'. Three basic hypotheses are presented: the additivity hypothesis that the more factors an event satisfies, the higher the probability that it becomes news; the complementarity hypothesis that the factors will tend to exclude each other since if one factor is present it is less necessary for the other factors to be present for the event

to become news; and the exclusion hypothesis that events that satisfy none or very few factors will not become news. This theory is then tested on the news presented in four different Norwegian newspapers from the Congo and Cuba crises of July 1960 and the Cyprus crisis of March-April 1964, and the data are in the majority of cases found to be consistent with the theory. A dozen additional hypotheses are then deduced from the theory and their social implications are discussed. Finally, some tentative policy implications are formulated.

Краткое содержание.

Структура новостей из—за границы.

С помощью упрощенной психологии восприятия и нескольких дополнительных предположений представлена система, состоящая из 12-и факторов, описывающих события, которые вместе взятые, употребляются в качестве определения «ценности новостей».

Представлены три основные гипотезы:

1. Гипотеза усиления. Чем больше факторов какое—либо событие удовлетворяет, тем выше вероятность того, что оно станет новостью.
2. Гипотеза дополнения. Факторы имеют тенденцию к взаимному исключению. Если один из факторов имеется налицо, нет большей необходимости в наличии других факторов для того, чтобы событие стало новостью.
3. Гипотеза исключения. События, которые никаких факторов не удовлетворяют, или удовлетворяют лишь немногие факторы, не станут новостью.

Эта теория была проверена на новостях, сообщенных четырьмя норвежскими газетами о событиях в Конго и на Кубе в июле 1960г. и о событиях на Кипре в марте-апреле 1964г. Было установлено, что данные в большинстве случаев находятся в соответствии с выдвинутой теорией.

Затем из этой теории было дедуцировано около двенадцати дополнительных гипотез и их общественные аспекты подвергнуты анализу.

В заключение формулируется несколько предварительных аспектов политического характера.